Revision by conditionals: from hook to arrow by Chandler, Jake & Booth, Richard
Revision by Conditionals:
From Hook to Arrow
Jake Chandler1 , Richard Booth2
1La Trobe University
2Cardiff University
jacob.chandler@latrobe.edu.au, boothr2@cardiff.ac.uk
Abstract
The belief revision literature has largely focussed on the issue
of how to revise one’s beliefs in the light of information re-
garding matters of fact. Here we turn to an important but com-
paratively neglected issue: How might one extend a revision
operator to handle conditionals as input? Our approach to this
question of ‘conditional revision’ is distinctive insofar as it
abstracts from the controversial details of how to revise by
factual sentences. We introduce a ‘plug and play’ method for
uniquely extending any iterated belief revision operator to the
conditional case. The flexibility of our approach is achieved
by having the result of a conditional revision by a Ramsey
Test conditional (‘arrow’) determined by that of a plain re-
vision by its corresponding material conditional (‘hook’). It
is shown to satisfy a number of new constraints that are of
independent interest.
1 Introduction
The past three decades have witnessed the development of
a substantial, if inconclusive, body of work devoted to the
issue of belief revision, namely
(A) determining the impact of a local change in belief on
both (i) the remainder of one’s prior beliefs and (ii)
one’s prior conditional beliefs (‘Ramsey Test condi-
tionals’).
Surprisingly, however, very little has been done to this date
on the question of conditional belief revision, that is
(B) determining the impact of a local change in condi-
tional beliefs on both (i) and (ii).
Furthermore, nearly all of the few proposals to tackle is-
sue (B), namely (Hansson 1992), (Boutilier and Goldszmidt
1993), and (Nayak et al. 1996), have typically rested on
somewhat contentious assumptions about how to approach
(A). (A noteworthy exception to this (Kern-Isberner 1999),
who introduced a number of plausible general postulates
governing revision by conditionals whose impact on revision
simpliciter remains fairly modest. More on these below.)
In this paper, we consider the prospects of providing a
‘plug and play’ solution to issue (B) that is independent of
the details of how to address (A). Its remainder is organ-
ised as follows. First, in Section 2, we present some standard
background on problem (A), introducing along the way the
well-known notion of a Ramsey Test conditional or again
conditional belief. In Section 3, we outline and discuss our
proposal regarding (B). Subsection 3.1 presents the basic
idea, according to which computing the result of a revi-
sion by a Ramsey Test conditional can be derived by min-
imal modification, under constraints, of the outcome of a
revision by its corresponding material conditional. Our key
technical contribution is presented in Subsection 3.2, where
we prove that this minimal change under constraints can be
achieved by means of a simple and familiar transformation.
Subsection 3.3 outlines some interesting general properties
of the proposal. These strengthen, in a plausible manner,
the aforementioned constraints presented in (Kern-Isberner
1999) and are of independent interest. Subsection 3.4 con-
siders the upshot of pairing our proposal regarding (B) with
some well-known suggestions regarding how to tackle (A).
Finally, in Section 4, we compare the suggestion made with
existing work on the topic noting some important shortcom-
ings of the latter. We close the paper in Section 5 with a
number of questions for future research.
Due to space limitations, only a couple of the more im-
portant proofs have been provided, in a technical appendix.
A version of the paper containing all proofs can be accessed
online at http://arxiv.org/abs/2006.15811.
2 Revision
The beliefs of an agent are represented by a belief state. Such
states will be denoted by upper case Greek letters Ψ,Θ, . . ..
We denote by S the set of all such states. Each state de-
termines a belief set, a consistent and deductively closed
set of sentences, drawn from a finitely generated proposi-
tional, truth-functional language L, equipped with the stan-
dard connectives ⊃, ∧, ∨, and ¬. We denote the belief set
associated with state Ψ by [Ψ]. Logical equivalence is de-
noted by ≡ and the set of classical logical consequences of
Γ ⊆ L by Cn(Γ), with> denoting an arbitrary propositional
tautology. The set of propositional worlds will be denoted by
W and the set of models of a given sentence A by [[A]].
The operation of revision ∗ returns the posterior state Ψ ∗
A that results from an adjustment of Ψ to accommodate the
inclusion of the consistent input A in its associated belief
set, in such a way as to maintain consistency of the resulting
belief set.
The beliefs resulting from single revisions are conve-
niently representable by a conditional belief set [Ψ]c, which
can be viewed as encoding the agent’s rules of inference over
L in state Ψ. It is defined via the Ramsey Test:
(RT) For all A,B ∈ L, A⇒ B ∈ [Ψ]c iff B ∈ [Ψ ∗A]
We shall call Lc the minimal extension of L that additionally
includes all sentences of the form A⇒ B, with A,B ∈ L.
We shall call sentences of the form A⇒ B ‘conditionals’
and sentences of the form A ⊃ B ‘material conditionals’.
We shall say that a sentence of the form A⇒ B is consistent
just in case A ∧ B is consistent (later in the paper, we shall
explicitly disallow revisions by inconsistent conditionals).
Conditional belief sets are constrained by the AGM pos-
tulates of (Alchourro´n, Ga¨rdenfors, and Makinson 1985;
Darwiche and Pearl 1997) (henceforth ‘AGM’). Given these,
[Ψ]c corresponds to a consistency-preserving rational con-
sequence relation, in the sense of (Lehmann and Magi-
dor 1992). Equivalently, it is representable by a total pre-
order (TPO) 4Ψ of worlds, such that A⇒ B ∈ [Ψ]c iff
min(4Ψ, JAK) ⊆ JBK (Grove 1988; Katsuno and Mendel-
zon 1991). Note that A ∈ [Ψ] iff >⇒ A ∈ [Ψ]c or equiva-
lently iff min(4Ψ,W ) ⊆ [[A]].
Following convention, we shall call principles presented
in terms of belief sets ‘syntactic’, and call ‘semantic’ those
principles couched in terms of TPOs, denoting the latter by
subscripting the corresponding syntactic principle with ‘4’.
Due to space considerations and for ease of exposition, we
will largely restrict our focus to a semantic perspective on
our problem of interest.
The AGM postulates do not entail that one’s conditional
beliefs are determined by one’s beliefs—in the sense that,
if [Ψ] = [Θ], then [Ψ]c = [Θ]c—and there is widespread
consensus that such determination would be unduly restric-
tive, with (Hansson 1992) providing supporting arguments.
A fortiori, one should not identify conditional beliefs with
beliefs in the corresponding material conditional. That said,
there does remain a connection between A⇒ B ∈ [Ψ]c and
A ⊃ B ∈ [Ψ]. The following is well known:
Proposition 1. Given AGM, (a) if A⇒ B ∈ [Ψ]c, then
A ⊃ B ∈ [Ψ], but (b) the converse does not hold.
Indeed, (a) is simply equivalent, given (RT), to the AGM
postulate of Inclusion, according to which [Ψ ∗ A] ⊆
Cn([Ψ] ∪ {A}). This suggests the following catchline:
‘Conditional beliefs are beliefs in material condition-
als plus’
That is, conditional beliefs are beliefs in material condition-
als that satisfy certain additional constraints.
Regarding the conditional beliefs resulting from single re-
visions, i.e. the beliefs resulting from sequences of two revi-
sions, we assume an ‘irrelevance of syntax’ property, which,
in its semantic form, is given by:
(Eq∗4) If A ≡ B, then 4Ψ∗A=4Ψ∗B
Given this principle, we take the liberty to abuse both lan-
guage and notation and occasionally speak of revision by a
set of worlds S rather than by an arbitrary sentence whose
set of models is given by S.
The DP postulates of (Darwiche and Pearl 1997) provide
widely endorsed further constraints. We simply give them
here in their semantic form:
(C1∗4) If x, y ∈ [[A]] then x 4Ψ∗A y iff x 4Ψ y
(C2∗4) If x, y ∈ [[¬A]] then x 4Ψ∗A y iff x 4Ψ y
(C3∗4) If x ∈ [[A]], y ∈ [[¬A]] and x ≺Ψ y, then
x ≺Ψ∗A y
(C4∗4) If x ∈ [[A]], y ∈ [[¬A]] and x 4Ψ y, then
x 4Ψ∗A y
Importantly, while there appears to be a degree of consen-
sus that these postulates should be strengthened, there is no
agreement as to how this should be done. Popular options
include the principles respectively associated with the oper-
ators of natural revision ∗N (Boutilier 1996), restrained revi-
sion ∗R (Booth and Meyer 2006) and lexicographic revision
∗L (Nayak, Pagnucco, and Peppas 2003), semantically de-
fined as follows:
Definition 1. The operators ∗N, ∗R and ∗L are such that:
x 4Ψ∗NA y iff (1) x ∈ min(4Ψ, [[A]]), or (2) x, y /∈
min(4Ψ, [[A]]) and x 4Ψ y
x 4Ψ∗RA y iff (1) x ∈ min(4Ψ, [[A]]), or (2) x, y /∈
min(4Ψ, [[A]]) and either (a) x ≺Ψ y or (b) x ∼Ψ y
and (x ∈ [[A]] or y ∈ [[¬A]])
x 4Ψ∗LA y iff (1) x ∈ [[A]] and y ∈ [[¬A]], or (2)
(x ∈ [[A]] iff y ∈ [[A]]) and x 4Ψ y.
The suitability of all three operators, which we will group
here under the heading of ‘elementary revision operators’
(Chandler and Booth 2019), has been called into question.
Indeed, they assume that a state Ψ can be identified with
its corresponding TPO4Ψ and that belief revision functions
map pairs of TPOs and sentences onto TPOs. (For this rea-
son, we will sometimes abuse language and notation and
speak, for instance, of the lexicographic revision of a TPO
rather than of a state.) But this assumption has been criti-
cised as implausible, with (Booth and Chandler 2017) pro-
viding a number of counterexamples.
Accordingly, (Booth and Chandler 2018; Booth and
Chandler 2020) propose a strengthening of the DP postulates
that is weak enough to avoid an identification of states with
TPOs and is consistent with the characteristic postulates of
both ∗R and ∗L (albeit not of ∗N). They suggest associat-
ing states with structures that are richer than TPOs: ‘proper
ordinal interval (POI) assignments’.
3 Conditional Revision
We now turn to our question of interest: How might one ex-
tend a revision operator to handle conditionals as inputs?
We shall call such an extended operator, which maps pairs
of states and consistent sentences in Lc onto states, a condi-
tional revision operator.
In view of the considerable disagreement regarding revi-
sion that we noted in the previous section, it would be de-
sirable to find a solution that abstracts from some of the de-
tails regarding how this problem is handled. In what follows,
we shall propose a method that achieves just this. The idea
that we will exploit is that the result of a conditional revi-
sion by a Ramsey Test conditional is determined by that of
a plain revision by its corresponding material conditional.
More specifically, we will be suggesting the following kind
of procedure for constructing 4Ψ∗A⇒B :
(1) Determine 4Ψ∗A⊃B .
(2) Remain as ‘close’ to this TPO as possible, while:
(a) ensuring that A⇒ B ∈ [Ψ ∗A⇒ B]c, and
(b) retaining some of4Ψ∗A⊃B’s relevant features.
Our proposal then is to derive 4Ψ∗A⇒B from 4Ψ∗A⊃B , via
distance minimisation under constraints. Importantly, this
suggestion does not tie us to any particular revision opera-
tor, since it takes 4Ψ∗A⊃B as its starting point, irrespective
of how it is arrived at.
3.1 Distance-Minimisation Under Constraints
In an early paper on conditional revision, (Nayak et al. 1996)
suggest that the task of conditional revision is no different
from that of revision by the corresponding material condi-
tional. Indeed, they note that, on their view of rational re-
vision, whereby they identify ∗ with lexicographic revision
∗L, revision by the material conditional is sufficient to en-
sure that the corresponding conditional is included in the
resulting conditional belief set. In other words, identifying
∗A⇒ B with ∗LA ⊃ B is sufficient to secure the following
desirable property of ‘Success’ for conditional revisions:
(S∗4) min(4Ψ∗A⇒B , [[A]]) ⊆ [[B]]
(S∗) A⇒ B ∈ [Ψ ∗A⇒ B]c
Since we have, in Section 2, rejected identifying rational re-
vision with lexicographic revision, Nayak et al’s proposal is
not on the cards for us. But one might still wonder whether
there exists a more acceptable conception of iterated revi-
sion that, like lexicographic revision, allows us to meet the
requirement of Success by simply revising by the material
conditional. But it is easy to find counterexamples to the
inclusion min(4Ψ∗A⊃B , [[A]]) ⊆ [[B]] for the best known
strengthenings of the DP postulates (Figure 1 provides a
case in point for restrained revision). In fact, we can eas-
ily show that, given mild conditions, lexicographic revision
is the only operator that fits the bill:
Proposition 2. If ∗ satisfies AGM, (C1∗4), (C2∗4), (Eq∗4),
and the principle according to which, for all A,B ∈ L and
Ψ ∈ S, A⇒ B ∈ [Ψ ∗A ⊃ B]c, then ∗ = ∗L.
A ∧B ¬A A ∧ ¬B
1 2 3
4 5
6
7
8
A ∧B ¬A A ∧ ¬B
3
1 2
4 5
6
8
7
∗R A ⊃ B
Figure 1: Illustration of min(4Ψ∗A⊃B , [[A]]) * [[B]] with ∗ = ∗R.
The relation Ψ orders the worlds—depicted by numbers—from
bottom to top, with the minimal world on the lowest level. The
columns group worlds according to the sentences that they validate.
We can see that, here, min(4Ψ∗RA⊃B , [[A]]) = {8} ⊂ [[¬B]].
Short of endorsing lexicographic revision, then, revision by
the corresponding material conditional is not sufficient for
the inclusion of a conditional in the resulting belief set. So
just as conditional beliefs can be viewed as ‘beliefs in mate-
rial conditionals plus’, we could say that:
‘Conditional revision is revision by material condi-
tionals plus.’
How, then, might we plausibly modify 4Ψ∗A⊃B so as to
arrive at a TPO 4Ψ∗A⇒B that satisfies (S∗4)?
Satisfaction of this principle, of course, will require some
worlds in [[A ∧ B]] to be promoted in the ranking, notably
in relation to certain worlds in [[A ∧ ¬B]]. But we must be
cautious as to how this is to take place. Plausibly, for in-
stance, it should not occur at the expense of the worlds in
[[¬A]]. In fact, it seems quite reasonable that, more broadly,
the internal ordering of [[A ⊃ B]] should be left untouched.
We therefore suggest supplementing (S∗4) with the follow-
ing ‘retainment’ principle, which ensures the preservation
of these features of 4Ψ∗A⊃B :
(Ret1∗4) If x, y ∈ [[A ⊃ B]], then x 4Ψ∗A⇒B y iff
x 4Ψ∗A⊃B y
Its syntactic counterpart is given as follows:
Proposition 3. Given AGM, (Ret1∗4) is equivalent to
(Ret1) If A ⊃ B ∈ Cn(C), then [(Ψ ∗A⇒ B) ∗ C] =
[(Ψ ∗A ⊃ B) ∗ C]
Given the DP postulates, this constraint obviously translates
into one that connects4Ψ and4Ψ∗A⇒B and whose syntactic
counterpart is easily inferable from Proposition 3:
Proposition 4. Given (C1∗4), (Ret1∗4) is equivalent to:
(Ret1′∗4) If x, y ∈ [[A ⊃ B]], then x 4Ψ∗A⇒B y iff
x 4Ψ y
That conditional revision does not affect the internal order-
ing of [[A∧B]] or of [[¬A]] is in fact required by a set of prin-
ciples for conditional revision proposed in (Kern-Isberner
1999), to which we shall return later. Our principle adds to
these the constraint that conditional revision by A⇒ B does
not affect the relative standing of worlds in [[¬A]] in rela-
tion to worlds in [[A ∧B]]. This further restriction yields the
correct verdict in the following scenario:
Example 1. My friend and I have taken our preschoolers
Akira and Bashir on holiday. They slept in bunkbeds last
night. Since both beds were unmade by the morning, I ini-
tially believe that they did not choose to sleep in the same
bed but suspend judgment as to which respective beds they
did choose. Furthermore, in the event of coming to believe
that they in fact did decide to share a bed, I would suspend
judgment as to which bed they opted for. I then find out that,
if Akira slept on top, then Bashir would have done so too
(because he does not like people sleeping above him). What
changes? Plausibly, my beliefs will change in the following
respect: since I will still believe that they did not share a
bed, I will now infer that Akira slept on the bottom bed and
Bashir on the top. What of my conditional beliefs? Plausi-
bly, we will have the following continuity: It will remain the
case that, were to find out that they in fact decided to share a
bed, I would suspend judgment as to which bed they chose.
Indeed, let A and B respectively stand for Akira and for
Bashir’s sleeping on the top bed and Ψ be my initial state.
Assume for simplicity that the set of atomic propositions in
L is {A,B}. Let [[A ∧ ¬B]] = {x}, [[¬A ∧ B]] = {y},
[[A ∧ B]] = {z} and [[¬A ∧ ¬B]] = {w}. We then have 4Ψ
plausibly given by x ∼Ψ y ≺Ψ z ∼Ψ w. Since z ∼Ψ w, our
principle entails the plausible result that z ∼Ψ∗A⇒B w.
But unfortunately, (S∗4) and (Ret1
∗
4) are not generally
jointly sufficient to have the TPO 4Ψ∗A⊃B determine the
TPO 4Ψ∗A⇒B . Our suggestion is to close the gap by means
of distance minimisation. More specifically, we propose to
consider the closest TPO that satisfies–or, in the event of a
tie, some aggregation of the closest TPOs that satisfy–our
two constraints.
In terms of measuring the distance between TPOs, a nat-
ural choice is the so-called Kemeny distance dK :
Definition 2. dK(4,4′) := |(4 − 4′) ∪ (4′ − 4)|.
Informally, dK(4,4′) returns the number of disagreements
over relations of weak preference between the two order-
ings, returning the number of pairs that are in 4 but not in
4′ and vice versa. This measure is standard fare in the social
choice literature. It was introduced there in (Kemeny 1959)
and received an axiomatisation in terms of a set of prima
facie attractive properties in (Kemeny and Snell 1962).
In the section that follows we shall show that there ex-
ists a unique dK-closest TPO that meets the requirements
(S∗4) and (Ret1
∗
4), which can be obtained from 4Ψ∗A⊃B in
a simple and familiar manner.
3.2 A Construction of the Posterior TPO
To outline our main result, we first need the following item
of notation (see Figure 2 for illustration):
Definition 3. For any sentence A ∈ L and TPO 4, we de-
note by D(4, A) the down-set of the members of min(4
, [[A]]). It is given by D(4, A) := {x | x 4 z, for some z ∈
min(4, [[A]])}.
A ∧B ¬A A ∧ ¬B
3
1 2
4 5
6
8
7
Figure 2: Down-set D(4Ψ∗A⊃B , A ∧ B) of the members of
min(4Ψ∗A⊃B , [[A∧B]]). The set min(4Ψ∗A⊃B , [[A∧B]]), which
here is a singleton, is marked by a dashed box.D(4Ψ∗A⊃B , A∧B)
is marked by a solid box.
With this in hand, we propose:
Definition 4. Let ∗ be a function from S × L to S. Then we
denote by~ an arbitrary extension of ∗ to the domain S×Lc,
such that 4Ψ~A⇒B is given by the lexicographic revision of
4Ψ∗A⊃B by D(4Ψ∗A⊃B , A ∧B) ∩ [[A ⊃ B]].1
The operator so-defined is illustrated in Figure 3, which de-
picts the resulting relation between 4Ψ∗A⊃B and 4Ψ~A⇒B .
Interestingly, in the special case of a Ramsey Test condi-
tional with a tautologous antecedent, this transformation of
4Ψ∗A⊃B amounts to its natural revision by the consequent.
A ∧B ¬A A ∧ ¬B
3
1 2
4 5
6
8
7
A ∧B ¬A A ∧ ¬B
3
1 2
8
4 5
6
7
Figure 3: Relation between 4Ψ∗A⊃B (depicted on the left) and
4Ψ~A⇒B (depicted on the right). D(4Ψ∗A⊃B , A∧B)∩ [[A ⊃ B]]
is marked by a box.
We propose to identify 4Ψ∗A⇒B with 4Ψ~A⇒B . We do so
on the basis of our main technical result, which is:
Theorem 1. The unique TPO that minimises the distance
dK to 4Ψ∗A⊃B , given constraints (S∗4) and (Ret1∗4) is
given by 4Ψ~A⇒B .
As indicated above, short of endorsing lexicographic revi-
sion, which we do not want to do, the constraint of Success
prevents us from having [Ψ ∗ A⇒ B]c = [Ψ ∗ A ⊃ B]c for
all A,B ∈ L, Ψ ∈ S. Having said that, a restricted version
of this equality does hold for our proposal in the form of the
following plausible ‘Vacuity’ postulate, which tells us that if
revision by the material conditional leads to the conditional
being accepted, then it is revision enough:
(V∗) If A⇒ B ∈ [Ψ ∗A ⊃ B]c, then
[Ψ ∗A⇒ B]c = [Ψ ∗A ⊃ B]c
Furthermore, as a consequence of one of the results estab-
lished in the proof of Theorem 1, we can also derive an inter-
esting minimal change result with a more syntactic flavour:
Proposition 5. Let ∗ be a function from S × L to S and ∗′
an extension of ∗ to the domain S× Lc, satisfying (S∗4) and
(Ret1∗4). Then, if [Ψ ∗′ A⇒ B]c agrees with [Ψ ∗ A ⊃
B]c on all conditionals with a given antecedent C, so does
[Ψ~A⇒ B]c
3.3 Some General Features
We have seen that our proposal to handle conditional revi-
sion using distance minimisation under constraints yields a
unique TPO that can be obtained via lexicographic revision
of 4Ψ∗A⊃B by a particular proposition. In this section, we
discuss some of its general consequences, including three
additional retainment principles that it implies.
It is easy to establish the following:
Proposition 6. Let ∗ be a function from S × Lc to S. Then,
if ∗ = ~, then ∗ satisfies:
1In case we identify states with TPOs, there will exist only one
such extension.
(Ret2∗4) If x, y ∈ [[A ∧ ¬B]], then x 4Ψ∗A⇒B y iff
x 4Ψ∗A⊃B y
(Ret3∗4) If x ∈ [[A ⊃ B]], y ∈ [[A ∧ ¬B]], and
x ≺Ψ∗A⊃B y, then x ≺Ψ∗A⇒B y
(Ret4∗4) If x ∈ [[A ⊃ B]], y ∈ [[A ∧ ¬B]], and
x 4Ψ∗A⊃B y, then x 4Ψ∗A⇒B y2
The conjunction of (Ret1∗4), with these three principles
simply tells us that the only admissible transformations,
when moving from4Ψ∗A⊃B to4Ψ∗A⇒B , involve a doxastic
‘demotion’ of worlds in [[A ∧ ¬B]] in relation to worlds in
[[A ⊃ B]], raising, in the ordering, the position of the former
in relation to the latter. They have a similar flavour to that of
the DP postulates, which tell us that that the only admissible
transformations, when moving from 4Ψ to 4Ψ∗A, involve a
demotion of worlds in [[¬A]] in relation to worlds in [[A]].
We note the immediate implications of these principles,
in the presence of the DP postulates:
Proposition 7. Given (C1∗4)–(C4∗4), (Ret2∗4) holds iff:
(Ret2′∗4) If x, y ∈ [[A ∧ ¬B]], x 4Ψ∗A⇒B y iff x 4Ψ y
and (Ret3∗4) and (Ret4
∗
4) respectively entail:
(Ret3′∗4) If x ∈ [[A ⊃ B]], y ∈ [[A ∧ ¬B]], and x ≺Ψ y,
then x ≺Ψ∗A⇒B y
(Ret4′∗4) If x ∈ [[A ⊃ B]], y ∈ [[A ∧ ¬B]], and x 4Ψ y,
then x 4Ψ∗A⇒B y
but the converse entailments do not hold.
The syntactic counterparts of (Ret2∗4)–(Ret4
∗
4) are given
in the following proposition, with the counterparts of
(Ret2′∗4)–(Ret4
′∗
4) being easily inferable from these:
Proposition 8. Given AGM, (Ret2∗4)–(Ret4∗4) are respec-
tively equivalent to
(Ret2) If A ∧ ¬B ∈ Cn(C), then [(Ψ ∗A⇒ B) ∗ C] =
[(Ψ ∗A ⊃ B) ∗ C]
(Ret3) If A ⊃ B ∈ [(Ψ ∗A ⊃ B) ∗ C], then A ⊃ B ∈
[(Ψ ∗A⇒ B) ∗ C]
(Ret4) If A ∧ ¬B /∈ [(Ψ ∗A ⊃ B) ∗ C], then A ∧ ¬B /∈
[(Ψ ∗A⇒ B) ∗ C]
In introducing (Ret1) above, we noted that, given (C1∗4), it
strengthens, in a plausible manner, part of a principle pro-
posed in (Kern-Isberner 1999). It turns out that, in the pres-
ence of the full set of DP postulates, (Ret1)–(Ret4) en-
able us to recover the trio of principles proposed by Kern-
Isberner. These “KI postulates”, originally named “(CR5)”
to“(CR7)”, are given semantically by:
2It turns out that this set of principles is sufficient to fully char-
acterise our proposal when supplemented with (S∗4), (Ret1∗4) and
the two following further postulates:
(Ret5∗4) If x ∈ [[A ∧ ¬B]], y /∈ D(4Ψ∗A⊃B , A ∧B),
y ∈ [[A ⊃ B]], and x ≺Ψ∗A⊃B y, then x ≺Ψ∗A⇒B y
(Ret6∗4) If x ∈ [[A ∧ ¬B]], y /∈ D(4Ψ∗A⊃B , A ∧B),
y ∈ [[A ⊃ B]], and x 4Ψ∗A⊃B y, then x 4Ψ∗A⇒B y
These, however, are not immediately as clearly interpretable.
(KI1∗4) If x, y ∈ [[A ∧B]], x, y ∈ [[¬A]]
or x, y ∈ [[A ∧ ¬B]], then x 4Ψ y iff
x 4Ψ∗A⇒B y
(KI2∗4) If x ∈ [[A ∧B]], y ∈ [[A ∧ ¬B]] and x ≺Ψ y,
then x ≺Ψ∗A⇒B y
(KI3∗4) If x ∈ [[A ∧B]], y ∈ [[A ∧ ¬B]] and x 4Ψ y,
then x 4Ψ∗A⇒B y
We can see that (KI1∗4) follows from (Ret1
∗
4) and (Ret2
∗
4),
given (C1∗4) and (C2
∗
4). (KI2
∗
4) follows from the conjunc-
tion of (Ret3∗4) and (C3
∗
4), while (KI3
∗
4) follows from the
conjunction of (Ret4∗4) and (C4
∗
4).
3
In view of Theorem 1 and Proposition 6, it follows that,
if a revision operator ∗ satisfies (C1∗4) to (C4∗4), then the
conditional revision~ operator that extends it in the manner
described in Definition 4 satisfies (KI1∗4) to (KI3
∗
4).
(Ret3∗4) and (Ret4
∗
4) tell us that conditional revision by
A⇒ B preserves any ‘good news’ for worlds in [[A ⊃ B]],
compared to worlds in [[A ∧ ¬B]], that revision by A ⊃ B
would bring. Given (C3∗4) and (C4
∗
4), they notably add to
(KI2∗4) and (KI3
∗
4) the idea that worlds in [[¬A]] should not
be demoted with respect to worlds in [[A ∧ ¬B]] in moving
from 4Ψ to 4Ψ∗A⇒B . The appeal of this constraint is high-
lighted in the following case:
Example 2. I am due to visit my hometown and would like
to catch up with my friends Alex and Ben. Unfortunately,
both of them moved away years ago and I doubt that I will
see either. If I were to find out of either of them that he was
going to be around, I would still believe that the other was
not. Furthermore if I were to find out that exactly one of them
would be back, I would not be able to guess which one of the
two that would be. A friend now tells me that if Alex will be
in town, then so will Ben. Very clearly, it should not be the
case that, as a result of this new information, I would now
take Alex to be a more plausible candidate for being the only
one of my two friends that I will see (quite the contrary).
Let A and B respectively stand for Alex and for Ben’s being
back in town and Ψ be my initial state. Assume for simplic-
ity that the set of atomic propositions in L is simply {A,B}.
Let [[A∧¬B]] = {x}, [[¬A∧B]] = {y}, [[A∧B]] = {z} and
[[¬A ∧ ¬B]] = {w}. We then have 4Ψ plausibly given by
w ≺Ψ x ∼Ψ y ≺Ψ z. Since y 4Ψ x, our principle entails
that y 4Ψ∗A⇒B x, as it intuitively should be.
Aside from entailing the three further retainment princi-
ples that we have discussed, we also note that our postu-
lates have the happy consequence of securing the following
‘Doxastic Equivalence’ principle, according to which condi-
tional revisions are indistinguishable from revisions by ma-
terial conditionals at the level of belief sets:
(DE∗4) min(4Ψ∗A⇒B ,W ) = min(4Ψ∗A⊃B ,W )
More precisely, it is easy to show that:
3We note that the KI postulates, in turn, subsume the DP pos-
tulates, which correspond to the special cases in which A = >.
Indeed, (KI1∗4) yields the conjunction of (C1
∗
4) and (C2∗4), while
(KI2∗4) and (KI3
∗
4) give us (C3
∗
4) and (C4∗4), respectively.
Proposition 9. (S∗4), (Ret1∗4), (Ret3∗4) and (Ret4∗4) col-
lectively entail (DE∗4).
3.4 Elementary Conditional Revision Operators
A few interesting observations can be made regarding the
more specific case in which ∗ is an elementary operator
(i.e. belongs to the set {∗N, ∗R, ∗L}), which we illustrate in
Figure 4. Having said that, we have noted above our sig-
nificant reservations about identifying rational revision with
any of these operators. This section is therefore addressed to
those who are rather more optimistic.
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Figure 4: Two-step procedure for revision by A⇒ B according
to the respective proposed extensions of the elementary operators.
D(4Ψ∗A⊃B , A∧B)∩ [[A ⊃ B]] is marked by a box. The first step
is denoted by a full arrow and the second by a dashed arrow.
First, we note that, in two of the special cases of interest,
one of our two steps becomes superfluous.
If ∗ = ∗L, then the second step of our procedure is re-
dundant. Indeed, for any x such that x ∈ [[A ∧ B]] and any
y ∈ [[A ∧ ¬B]], we have x ≺Ψ∗LA⊃B y. Hence every world
that is in D(4Ψ∗A⊃B , A∧B)∩ [[A ⊃ B]] is already strictly
more minimal, in 4Ψ∗A⊃B , than any world that is not.
If ∗ = ∗N, then the first step of our procedure plays
no role: we would obtain the same result by simply di-
rectly applying the second transformation to the initial TPO.
This is apparent from the fact that natural revision by A ⊃
B leaves unaffected the respective internal orderings of
D(4Ψ∗A⊃B , A ∧B), D(4Ψ∗A⊃B , A ∧B) ∩ [[A ⊃ B]] and
D(4Ψ∗A⊃B , A ∧ B) ∩ [[A ∧ ¬B]], while the latter, on our
proposal, jointly determine 4Ψ∗A⇒B .
Secondly, in the case of elementary operators more gen-
erally, it can be shown that, on our proposal for ∗A⇒ B, the
posterior internal ordering 4Ψ∗A⇒B ∩[[A]] of the set of A-
worlds is recovered by revising by B the restriction 4 ∩[[A]]
of the prior ordering to the A-worlds:4
Proposition 10. If ∗ is an elementary revision operator, then
∗ and ~ satisfy: 4Ψ~A⇒B ∩[[A]] = (4Ψ ∩[[A]]) ∗B.
In other words: if one disregards the worlds in which the
antecedent is false, the proposed transformation amounts to
revision by the consequent.
Finally, in (Chandler and Booth 2019, Theorem 4), it was
noted that there is an interesting connection between natu-
ral revision and the rational closure operator Crat (Lehmann
and Magidor 1992, Defs 20 and 21), which minimally ex-
tends any consistent set of conditionals to a set of condition-
als corresponding to a rational consequence relation. This
connection was that, if ¬A /∈ [Ψ]c, then [Ψ ∗N A]c =
Crat([Ψ]c ∪{A}). This connection deepens on the proposed
extension of natural revision to the conditional case. The
proof of Chandler & Booth’s theorem can be built upon to
establish the following non-trivial result:
Proposition 11. If ∗ = ∗N, then, if A⇒ ¬B /∈ [Ψ]c, then
[Ψ~A⇒ B]c = Crat([Ψ]c ∪ {A⇒ B})
4 Related Research
We have already presented Kern-Isberner’s trio of postulates
for conditional revision and briefly discussed (and rejected)
Nayak et al’s suggestion to treat conditional revision as lex-
icographic revision by a material conditional. In this section
we turn to two further proposals that have been made in the
literature and briefly compare them to ours. As we shall see,
these both commit to identifying ∗ with ∗N–which we have
argued is undesirable–and exhibit further shortcomings.5
4.1 Hansson
(Hansson 1992) also takes a distance based approach, albeit
an unconstrained one. He proposes to use the operator ∗H:
Definition 5. [Ψ ∗H A⇒ B]c :=
⋂
[Θi]c, such that the Θi
minimise the distance to Ψ, subject to the constraint that
A⇒ B ∈ [Θi]c.
The fate of this suggestion, of course, hinges on (i) one’s
view of the nature of states and (ii) the distance metric used.
But if one equates states with TPOs and measures distance
by means of dK , then, first of all, rational revision coincides
with natural revision: Ψ ∗ >⇒ B = Ψ ∗N B. Indeed:
Proposition 12. Let ? be a revision operator that satisfies
AGM. Then, if 4Ψ∗NA 6=4Ψ?A, then dK(4Ψ∗NA,4Ψ) <
dK(4Ψ?A,4Ψ).
4If, that is, we extend in the obvious manner the domain of ∗ to
cover any TPO over some subset of W .
5We have left for a future occasion the comparison of our
approach with the somewhat complex “c-revision” framework of
(Kern-Isberner 2004), defined in terms of transformations of “con-
ditional valuation functions”, which include probability, possibility
and ranking functions as special cases.
This, we take, is already not an appealing feature. Further-
more, Hansson’s use of the intersection of a set of rational
conditional belief sets should raise concerns, since it is well
known that such intersections can fail to be rational. As it
turns out, this worry is substantiated, and his suggestion is
in fact inconsistent with at least one of the AGM postulates:
Proposition 13. The operator ∗H does not satisfy
(K8∗) If ¬B /∈ [Ψ ∗A], then Cn([Ψ ∗A] ∪ {B}) ⊆
[Ψ ∗A ∧B]
An alternative way of aggregating the closest TPOs, which
would guarantee an AGM-compliant output, would be to
make use of an extension to the n-ary case of the binary TPO
aggregation operator ⊕STQ of (Booth and Chandler 2019).
We leave the study of this option to those who are more en-
thusiastic about the prospects of natural revision.
4.2 Boutilier & Goldszmidt
(Boutilier and Goldszmidt 1993) offer an alternative exten-
sion of ∗N, which makes use of two further standard belief
change operators: (i) the contraction operator ÷, which re-
turns the posterior state Ψ ÷ A that results from an adjust-
ment of Ψ to accommodate the retraction of A and (ii) the
expansion operator +, which is similar to revision, save that
consistency of the resulting beliefs needn’t be ensured.
Like ours, their proposal involves a two-stage process, this
time involving a first step of contraction by A⇒ ¬B, then a
step of expansion by A⇒ B. In the case in which A⇒ B is
not initially accepted, the contraction step involves moving
the minimal [[A ∧ B]] worlds down to the rank r in which
the minimal [[A ∧ ¬B]] worlds sit. The expansion step then
has these minimal [[A ∧ ¬B]] worlds move up to a position
immediately above r, while preserving their relations with
any worlds that were strictly above or below them. Formally:
Definition 6. The Boutilier-Goldszmidt contraction opera-
tor ÷BG is such that
(1) If x, y /∈ min(4Ψ, [[A∧B]]), then x 4Ψ÷BGA⇒¬B
y iff x 4Ψ y, and
(2) If x ∈ min(4Ψ, [[A ∧B]]), then
(a) x 4Ψ÷BGA⇒¬B y iff z 4Ψ y, for some z ∈
min(4Ψ, [[A]]), and
(b) y 4Ψ÷BGA⇒¬B x iff y 4Ψ z, for some z ∈
min(4Ψ, [[A]])
Definition 7. The Boutilier-Goldszmidt expansion operator
+BG is such that
(1) If x /∈ min(4Ψ, [[A∧¬B]]), then x 4Ψ+BGA⇒B y
iff x 4Ψ y, and
(2) If x ∈ min(4Ψ, [[A ∧ ¬B]]), then
(a) if y ∈ min(4Ψ, [[A ∧ ¬B]]), then y 4Ψ+BGA⇒B
x, and
(b) if y /∈ min(4Ψ, [[A∧¬B]]), then x 4Ψ+BGA⇒B y
iff x 4Ψ y and there is no z ∈ min(4Ψ, [[A∧B]])
such that y 4Ψ z6
6This is not quite the original formulation, which, in view of the
informal description provided by the authors, appears to include a
number of typographical errors.
The corresponding revision operator is then defined as the
composition of ÷BGA⇒ ¬B and +BGA⇒ B:
Definition 8. The Boutilier-Goldszmidt revision operator
∗BG is given by Ψ ∗BG A⇒ B := (Ψ ÷BG A⇒ ¬B) +BG
A⇒ B.
The operation +BGA⇒ B bears some striking similarities
to the second step in our construction of ∗A⇒ B. In fact, it
coincides with it in the kind of circumstances under which it
is supposed to operate, i.e. on the heels of ÷BGA⇒ ¬B.
Having said that, the introduction of the contraction step
means that, overall, Boutilier & Goldszmidt’s proposal quite
clearly departs from the proposed extension of ∗N put for-
ward in the previous section. In Figure 5, we see that it no-
tably violates the requirement (Ret1∗4), according to which
the ordering internal to [[A ⊃ B]] should be preserved
(since, although 4, 7 ∈ [[A ⊃ B]] and 7 ≺Ψ 4, we have
4 ≺Ψ∗BGA⇒B 7). This particular example is also an instance
of the following feature of their revision operator:
Proposition 14. If A ∈ [Ψ], then A ∧B ∈ [Ψ ∗BG A⇒ B]
But this is a rather questionable property: it essentially pre-
cludes reasoning by Modus Tollens (aka denying the con-
sequent). The following example highlights the counterintu-
itive character of this proscription:
Example 3. I believe that the light in the bathroom next
door is on (A), because the light switch in this room is down
(¬B). The owner of the house tells me that, contrary to what
one might expect, when the bathroom light is on, that means
that the switch in this room is up. So I revise by A⇒ B. In
doing so, I maintain my belief about the state of the switch
(¬B) and conclude that the bathroom light is off (¬A).
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Figure 5: Illustrations of Boutilier & Goldszmidt’s two-step pro-
posal for extending ∗N, contrasted with our own (denoted by ~N).
The set min(4Ψ, [[A ∧B]]) is marked by a dashed box.
5 Concluding Comments
In what precedes we have offered a fresh approach to the
problem of revision by conditionals, which imposes no con-
straints on the behaviour of the revision operator in relation
to non-conditional inputs. This independence was achieved
by deriving the result of a revision by a conditional from
the result of a revision by its material counterpart. This ap-
proach, we have argued, satisfies a number of attractive new
properties and enjoys a number of distinctive advantages
over existing alternative proposals.
Having said that, the scope of a number of results that we
have established could perhaps be broadened.
Firstly, Proposition 10 shows that, at the level of the inter-
nal ordering of [[A]], conditional revision by A⇒ B operates
like revision by B, for the special case of extensions of ele-
mentary revision operators. We do not know to what extent
this generalises to a broader class of revision operators, such
as the POI revision operators of (Booth and Chandler 2018;
Booth and Chandler 2020).
Secondly, we establish in Proposition 11 that, if ∗ = ∗N
and A⇒ ¬B /∈ [Ψ]c, then [Ψ ~ A⇒ B]c = Crat([Ψ]c ∪
{A⇒ B}). This raises the following question: For ∗ = ∗L
or ∗ = ∗R, if A⇒ ¬B /∈ [Ψ]c, do we have [Ψ ∗ A⇒ B]c =
C([Ψ]c ∪ {A⇒ B}) for some suitable closure operator C?
Finally, at a number of points, we have made use of the
distance metric dK , noting that it was ubiquitous in the so-
cial choice literature. We are however aware of at least one
alternative to this metric, proposed in (Duddy and Piggins
2012, Sec. 3.2), which coincides with dK in the special case
of linear orders. It would be interesting to assess the impact
of this alternative choice on the proposal made here (an-
other potential point of relevance concerns our assessment
of Hansson’s proposal, which also made use of dK).
In addition to the question of the generalisability of cer-
tain results, we note that there is an extensive literature on
a related issue for models of graded, rather than categori-
cal, belief (esp. probabilistic models): how to update one’s
degrees of belief on information specifying a particular con-
ditional degree of belief or presented in the form of a natu-
ral language indicative conditional. A natural approach here
is to move to the posterior distribution that is “closest” to
the prior one, on some appropriate distance measure, subject
of the relevant informational constraint. However, an appar-
ent issue with the use of the popular cross-entropy measure
was presented in the classic Judy Benjamin example of (van
Fraassen 1981), with similar observations being made in re-
lation to two further measures in (van Fraassen, Hughes, and
Harman 1986). For further discussions, see (Douven 2012),
(Douven and Dietz 2011), (Douven and Romeijn 2011),
(Eva, Hartmann, and Rad 2019), and (Grove and Halpern
1997). An examination of potential points of contact with
the present work would be interesting to pursue.
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Appendix
Proposition 2. If ∗ satisfies AGM, (C1∗4), (C2∗4), (Eq∗4),
and the principle according to which, for all A,B ∈ L and
Ψ ∈ S, A⇒ B ∈ [Ψ ∗A ⊃ B]c, then ∗ = ∗L.
Proof: Given AGM, (C1∗4), (C2∗4), and (Eq
∗
4), ∗L is
characterised by the ‘Recalcitrance’ property
(Rec∗) If A ∧B is consistent, then A ∈ [(Ψ ∗A) ∗B].
It will suffice to show that this property is entailed by:
(1) If A ∧B is consistent, then B ∈
[(Ψ ∗A ⊃ B) ∗A]
So let A ∧ B be consistent. Since A ≡ (A ⊃ B) ⊃ A, it
suffices, by (Eq∗) to show A ∈ [(Ψ ∗ (A ⊃ B) ⊃ A) ∗ B].
We know that for any AGM operator ∗′ and state Ψ′, A ∈
[(Ψ′ ∗′ B)] iff A ∈ [(Ψ′ ∗′ A ⊃ B)]. Hence it suffices to
show A ∈ [(Ψ ∗ (A ⊃ B) ⊃ A) ∗ A ⊃ B]. Since A ∧ B ≡
((A ⊃ B) ⊃ A) ∧ (A ⊃ B) is consistent, we can apply (1)
to recover the required result. 
Theorem 1. The unique TPO that minimises the distance
dK to 4Ψ∗A⊃B , given constraints (S∗4) and (Ret1∗4) is
given by 4Ψ~A⇒B .
Proof: We prove the result in three lemmas. The first of
these is the following:
Lemma 1. For any function ∗ from S × L to S, ~ satisfies
(S∗4) and (Ret1
∗
4).
We note that, given the definition of ∗L in Definition 1, Def-
inition 4 is equivalent to:
x 4Ψ~A⇒B y iff
(1) x ∈ D(4Ψ∗A⊃B , A ∧ B) ∩ [[A ⊃ B]] and y /∈
D(4Ψ∗A⊃B , A ∧B) ∩ [[A ⊃ B]], or
(2) (x ∈ D(4Ψ∗A⊃B , A ∧ B) ∩ [[A ⊃ B]] iff y ∈
D(4Ψ∗A⊃B , A∧B)∩[[A ⊃ B]]) and x 4Ψ∗A⊃B y
We now show that (S∗4) is satisfied. By definition,
D(4Ψ∗A⊃B , A ∧ B) ∩ [[A ∧ B]] 6= ∅. So let x be such
that x ∈ D(4Ψ∗A⊃B , A ∧ B) ∩ [[A ∧ B]]. Now consider
y ∈ [[A ∧ ¬B]]. By Definition 4, x ≺Ψ~A⇒B y, and hence
min(4Ψ~A⇒B , [[A]]) ⊆ [[B]], as required.
Regarding (Ret1∗4): Assume x, y ∈ [[A ⊃ B]]. For the
left to right direction, assume that x 4Ψ~A⇒B y. From this
one of either (1) or (2) holds. (2) immediately entails that
x 4Ψ∗A⊃B y. (1) gives us: x ∈ D(4Ψ∗A⊃B , A ∧ B) and
y /∈ D(4Ψ∗A⊃B , A ∧ B). x 4Ψ∗A⊃B y then follows from
the definition of D(4Ψ∗A⊃B , A ∧ B). For the right to left
direction, assume that x 4Ψ∗A⊃B y. If x, y ∈ D(4Ψ∗A⊃B
, A ∧ B) or x, y /∈ D(4Ψ∗A⊃B , A ∧ B), then we obtain
x 4Ψ~A⇒B y by (1). So assume that one of either x or
y is in D(4Ψ∗A⊃B , A ∧ B), while the other is not. From
x 4Ψ∗A⊃B y, it must be the case that x ∈ D(4Ψ∗A⊃B
, A ∧ B) and y /∈ D(4Ψ∗A⊃B , A ∧ B). From (2), we then
again recover x 4Ψ~A⇒B y.
Our next lemma states a general fact about lexicographic
combinations of ordered pairs of TPOs, defined by
Definition 9. The lexicographic combination lex(41,42)
of two TPOs 41 and 42 is given by the TPO 4 such that
x 4 y iff (i) x ≺1 y or (ii) x ∼1 y and x ≺2 y
It is given as follows:
Lemma 2. Let41,42 be two given TPOs and let X(42) =
{4|4 is a TPO s.t. 4⊆42}. Then the TPO in X(42) that
minimises the distance dK to 41 is lex(41,42).
Let 4′= lex(41,42). First we need to check that 4′∈
X(42), i.e. 4′⊆42. But this is clear from Definition 9. It
remains to be shown that dK(41,4′) ≤ dK(41,4′′) for all
4′′∈ X(42). To see this, we first reformulate dK .
Definition 10. A hard conflict between41,4′ is a 2-element
set {x, y} s.t. x ≺′ y and y ≺1 x. Let Hard(41,4′) denote
the set of such hard conflicts.
A soft conflict between 41,4′ is a 2-element set {x, y}
s.t. either (i) x ≺′ y and x ∼1 y or (ii) x ≺1 y and x ∼′ y.
Let Soft(41,4′) denote the set of such soft conflicts.
So dK(41,4′) = 2× |Hard(41,4′)|+ |Soft(41,4′)| and
similarly for dK(41,4′′). Hence, to show that dK(41,4′
) < dK(41,4′′) when 4′ 6=4′′, it suffices to prove
(1) Hard(41,4′) ⊆ Hard(41,4′′)
(2) Soft(41,4′) ⊆ Soft(41,4′′)
Regarding (1): Let {x, y} ∈ Hard(41,4′), i.e. x ≺1 y and
y ≺′ x. We must show y ≺′′ x. By definition of4′= lex(41
,42), we have, from y ≺′ x, (i) y ≺2 x or (ii) y ∼2 x and
y ≺1 x. We cannot have y ≺1 x, since we already have
x ≺1 y. So y ≺2 x. Hence, since4′′∈ X(42), i.e.4′′⊆42,
we have y ≺′ x as well, as required.
Regarding (2): Let {x, y} ∈ Soft(41,4′). We then have
two cases to consider:
- x ∼1 y and x ≺′ y: From x ≺′ y, we get either
(i) x ≺2 y or (ii) x ∼2 y and x ≺1 y. The lat-
ter cannot occur, since we assume x ∼1 y. Hence
x ≺2 y. Since 4′′⊆42, we also then have x ≺′′ y,
so {x, y} ∈ Soft(41,4′′), as required.
- x ∼′ y and x ≺1 y: Impossible, since x ∼′ y entails
that both x ∼1 y and x ∼2 y but we assume x ≺1 y.
We now show that:
Lemma 3. For any 4′ satisfying (S∗4) and (Ret1∗4), we
must have 4′⊆4D, where 4D is defined as follows:
x 4D y iff x ∈ D(4Ψ∗A⊃B , A ∧ B) ∩ [[A ⊃ B]] or
y /∈ D(4Ψ∗A⊃B , A ∧B) ∩ [[A ⊃ B]]
Let 4′ satisfy (S∗4) and (Ret1∗4). Suppose y 4D x. We
must show that y ≺′ x. From y 4D x, by definition of
4D, we have x /∈ D(4Ψ∗A⊃B , A ∧ B) ∩ [[A ⊃ B]] and
y ∈ D(4Ψ∗A⊃B , A∧B)∩[[A ⊃ B]]. From y ∈ D(4Ψ∗A⊃B
, A ∧ B), we have y 4Ψ∗A⊃B z, where z ∈ min(4Ψ∗A⊃B
, [[A ∧B]]). We now consider two cases:
- x ∈ [[A ⊃ B]]: Then, since x /∈ D(4Ψ∗A⊃B , A ∧
B) ∩ [[A ⊃ B]], we have x /∈ D(4Ψ∗A⊃B , A ∧ B)
and so, form this and y ∈ D(4Ψ∗A⊃B , A ∧ B), we
get y 4Ψ∗A⊃B x. Since x, y ∈ [[A ⊃ B]], we get
from this y ≺′ x by (Ret1∗4), as required.
- x ∈ [[A ∧ ¬B]]: By (S∗4), we know that u ≺′ x
for some u ∈ [[A ∧ B]]. By the minimality of z, we
know z 4Ψ∗A⊃B u. Hence y 4Ψ∗A⊃B u. Then, by
(Ret1∗4), we recover y 4′ u and so y ≺′ x, as re-
quired.
Putting together Lemmas 1, 2 and 3 yields the proof of the
theorem. Lemma 1 tells us that 4Ψ~A⇒B satisfies (S∗4) and
(Ret1∗4). Next, note that Definition 4 can be equivalently
presented in terms of a lexicographic combination, so that
4Ψ~A⇒B= lex(4D,4Ψ∗A⊃B).
In view of this, we can see that, by Lemma 2, 4Ψ~A⇒B
minimises dK to 4Ψ∗A⊃B among all TPOs 4 s.t. 4⊆4D.
Finally, since all 4 that satisfy (S∗4) and (Ret1∗4) are such
that4⊆4D, by Lemma 3,4Ψ~A⇒B must also minimise dK
among all TPOs satisfying (S∗4) and (Ret1
∗
4) . 
Proposition 5. Let ∗ be a function from S × L to S and ∗′
an extension of ∗ to the domain S× Lc, satisfying (S∗4) and
(Ret1∗4). Then, if [Ψ ∗′ A⇒ B]c agrees with [Ψ ∗ A ⊃
B]c on all conditionals with a given antecedent C, so does
[Ψ~A⇒ B]c
Proof: We will prove the equivalent statement: if [(Ψ ~
A⇒ B) ~ C] 6= [(Ψ ~ A ⊃ B) ~ C], then [(Ψ ∗′ A⇒
B) ∗′ C] 6= [(Ψ ∗′ A ⊃ B) ∗′ C].
Suppose [(Ψ ~ A⇒ B) ~ C] 6= [(Ψ ~ A ⊃ B) ~ C].
Then min(4Ψ~A⇒B , [[C]]) 6= min(4Ψ~A⊃B , [[C]]). So we
have two cases to consider, corresponding to the failures of
each direction of subset inclusion.
Assume min(4Ψ~A⇒B , [[C]]) * min(4Ψ∗A⊃B , [[C]]).
Let x ∈ min(4Ψ~A⇒B , [[C]]) − min(4Ψ∗A⊃B , [[C]]). Let
y ∈ min(4Ψ∗A⊃B , [[C]]). Then x 4Ψ~A⇒B y (by minimal-
ity of x) and y 4Ψ∗A⊃B x. Since x 4Ψ~A⇒B y , we know
that either x ∼Ψ~A⇒B y or x ≺Ψ~A⇒B y. By our con-
struction of ~, it is not possible to have both x ∼Ψ~A⇒B y
and y ≺Ψ∗A⊃B x. So we must have x ≺Ψ~A⇒B y and
hence {x, y} ∈ Hard(4Ψ~A⇒B ,4Ψ∗A⊃B). Now, since we
assume ∗′ to satisfy (S∗4) and (Ret1∗4), we know from
our proof of Theorem 1 that Hard(4Ψ~A⇒B ,4Ψ∗A⊃B) ⊆
Hard(4Ψ∗′A⇒B ,4Ψ∗A⊃B). So {x, y} ∈ Hard(4Ψ∗′A⇒B
,4Ψ∗A⊃B) and hence x ≺Ψ∗′A⇒B y. So we have y ∈
min(4Ψ∗′A⊃B , [[C]]) = min(4Ψ∗A⊃B , [[C]]) (since ∗′ ex-
tends ∗, i.e. agrees with it on unconditional revisions)
but y /∈ min(4Ψ∗′A⊃B , [[C]]). So min(4Ψ∗′A⊃B , [[C]]) 6=
min(4Ψ∗′A⇒B , [[C]]), i.e. [(Ψ∗′A⇒ B)∗′C] 6= [(Ψ∗′A ⊃
B) ∗′ C], as required
Assume min(4Ψ∗A⊃B , [[C]]) * min(4Ψ~A⇒B , [[C]]).
Let x ∈ min(4Ψ∗A⊃B , [[C]]) − min(4Ψ~A⇒B , [[C]]). Let
y ∈ min(4Ψ~A⇒B , [[C]]). Then y ≺Ψ~A⇒B x and
x 4Ψ∗A⊃B y, from which x ≺Ψ∗A⊃B y or x ∼Ψ∗A⊃B y.
If x ≺Ψ∗A⊃B y, then {x, y} ∈ Hard(4Ψ~A⇒B
,4Ψ∗A⊃B). Since, as noted above, Hard(4Ψ~A⇒B
,4Ψ∗A⊃B) ⊆ Hard(4Ψ∗′A⇒B ,4Ψ∗A⊃B), we
get y ≺Ψ∗′A⇒B x and so x ∈ min(4Ψ∗′A⊃B
, [[C]]) − min(4Ψ∗′A⇒B , [[C]]), i.e. [(Ψ ∗′ A⇒ B) ∗′ C] 6=
[(Ψ ∗′ A ⊃ B) ∗′ C], as required.
If x ∼Ψ∗A⊃B y, then {x, y} ∈ Soft(4Ψ~A⇒B ,4Ψ∗A⊃B
). Since, Soft(4Ψ~A⇒B ,4Ψ∗A⊃B) ⊆ Soft(4Ψ∗′A⇒B
,4Ψ∗A⊃B) (again, see proof of Theorem 1), we have
{x, y} ∈ Soft(4Ψ∗′A⇒B ,4Ψ∗A⊃B), so either x ≺Ψ∗′A⇒B
y or y ≺Ψ∗′A⇒B x. In the latter case, we get [(Ψ ∗′ A⇒
B) ∗′ C] 6= [(Ψ ∗′ A ⊃ B) ∗′ C] as above. In the for-
mer case, we deduce y /∈ min(4Ψ∗′A⇒B , [[C]]). But from
x ∼Ψ∗A⊃B y and x ∈ min(4Ψ∗A⊃B , [[C]]) we must
have y ∈ min(4Ψ∗A⊃B , [[C]]). Hence y ∈ min(4Ψ∗A⊃B
, [[C]]) − min(4Ψ∗′A⇒B , [[C]]), so min(4Ψ∗A⊃B , [[C]]) 6=
min(4Ψ∗′A⇒B , [[C]]), which gives again [(Ψ ∗′ A⇒ B) ∗′
C] 6= [(Ψ ∗′ A ⊃ B) ∗′ C], as required. 
References
Alchourro´n, C. E.; Ga¨rdenfors, P.; and Makinson, D. 1985.
On the logic of theory change: Partial meet contraction and
revision functions. Journal of Symbolic Logic 50(02):510–
530.
Booth, R., and Chandler, J. 2017. The irreducibility of it-
erated to single revision. J. Philosophical Logic 46(4):405–
418.
Booth, R., and Chandler, J. 2018. On strengthening the logic
of iterated belief revision: Proper ordinal interval operators.
In Principles of Knowledge Representation and Reasoning:
Proceedings of the Sixteenth International Conference, KR
2018, Tempe, Arizona, 30 October - 2 November 2018., 210–
219.
Booth, R., and Chandler, J. 2019. From iterated revision
to iterated contraction: Extending the Harper Identity. Artif.
Intell. 277.
Booth, R., and Chandler, J. 2020. On strengthening the logic
of iterated belief revision: Proper ordinal interval operators.
Artif. Intell. 285.
Booth, R., and Meyer, T. 2006. Admissible and re-
strained revision. Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
26(1):127–151.
Boutilier, C., and Goldszmidt, M. 1993. Revision by condi-
tional beliefs. In Proceedings of the 11th National Confer-
ence on Artificial Intelligence. Washington, DC, USA, July
11-15, 1993., 649–654.
Boutilier, C. 1996. Iterated revision and minimal change
of conditional beliefs. Journal of Philosophical Logic
25(3):263–305.
Chandler, J., and Booth, R. 2019. Elementary iterated revi-
sion and the Levi Identity. In Blackburn, P.; Lorini, E.; and
Guo, M., eds., Logic, Rationality, and Interaction - 7th In-
ternational Workshop, LORI 2019, Chongqing, China, Oc-
tober 18-21, 2019, Proceedings, volume 11813 of Lecture
Notes in Computer Science, 15–28. Springer.
Darwiche, A., and Pearl, J. 1997. On the logic of iterated
belief revision. Artificial Intelligence 89(1):1–29.
Douven, I., and Dietz, R. 2011. A puzzle about Stalnaker’s
Hypothesis. Topoi 30(1):31–37.
Douven, I., and Romeijn, J. 2011. A new resolution of the
Judy Benjamin problem. Mind 120(479):637–670.
Douven, I. 2012. Learning conditional information. Mind
& Language 27(3):239–263.
Duddy, C., and Piggins, A. 2012. A measure of distance be-
tween judgment sets. Social Choice and Welfare 39(4):855–
867.
Eva, B.; Hartmann, S.; and Rad, S. R. 2019. Learning from
conditionals. Mind fzz025.
Grove, A. J., and Halpern, J. Y. 1997. Probability update:
Conditioning vs. cross-entropy. In Proceedings of the Thir-
teenth Conference on Uncertainty in Artificial Intelligence,
UAI’97, 208–214. San Francisco, CA, USA: Morgan Kauf-
mann Publishers Inc.
Grove, A. 1988. Two modellings for theory change. Journal
of Philosophical Logic 17(2):157–170.
Hansson, S. O. 1992. In defense of the Ramsey Test. Jour-
nal of Philosophy 89(10):522.
Katsuno, H., and Mendelzon, A. O. 1991. Propositional
knowledge base revision and minimal change. Artificial In-
telligence 52(3):263–294.
Kemeny, J., and Snell, J. 1962. Mathematical Models in the
Social Sciences. Blaisdell, New York. Reprinted by MIT
Press, Cambridge, 1972.
Kemeny, J. G. 1959. Mathematics without numbers.
Daedalus 88(4):577–591.
Kern-Isberner, G. 1999. Postulates for conditional belief
revision. In Proceedings of the Sixteenth International Joint
Conference on Artificial Intelligence, IJCAI 99, Stockholm,
Sweden, July 31 - August 6, 1999. 2 Volumes, 1450 pages,
186–191.
Kern-Isberner, G. 2004. A thorough axiomatization of a
principle of conditional preservation in belief revision. Ann.
Math. Artif. Intell. 40(1-2):127–164.
Lehmann, D., and Magidor, M. 1992. What does a condi-
tional knowledge base entail? Artificial intelligence 55(1):1–
60.
Nayak, A. C.; Pagnucco, M.; Foo, N. Y.; and Peppas, P.
1996. Learning from conditionals: Judy Benjamin’s other
problems. In 12th European Conference on Artificial Intel-
ligence, Budapest, Hungary, August 11-16, 1996, Proceed-
ings, 75–79.
Nayak, A. C.; Pagnucco, M.; and Peppas, P. 2003. Dynamic
belief revision operators. Artificial Intelligence 146(2):193–
228.
van Fraassen, B.; Hughes, R. I. G.; and Harman, G. 1986.
A problem for relative information minimizers, continued.
British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 37(n/a):453–
475.
van Fraassen, B. C. 1981. A problem for relative informa-
tion minimizers in probability kinematics. British Journal
for the Philosophy of Science 32(4):375–379.
